Artist conception of DF-21D attacking a US naval task force
How many RIM-161 Standard Missile 3s (SM-3) would the U.S. Navy carrier task force need to intercept a massive ASBM attack? Do they have enough SM-3s and Phalanx close-in weapon systems for an attack of, let’s say, 20 ASBMs and 20 ASCMs at the same time? How about 30 a piece?
Seems like a high number to use? Well, China is aiming 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles, DF-11/15s, at Taiwan. Why not build 1,500 DF-21Ds? DF-21s are only a slightly upgraded variant of the DF-15.
Let’s not forget China’s Russian-built SS-N-22 Sunburns ASCMs (3M-80MBE) on four Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers. China procured 500 of these missiles from Russia. At Mach 3 with a 320 kg warhead they are my personal favorite ASCM since they avoid the typical trajectory of many anti-ship missiles by climbing above the ship before plunging down through the top of the deck. This helps to avoid Phalanx’s attempt to shoot it down.
BTW, guess who else has Russian Sunburns? The answer: Iran.
What would happen if you threw in submarine-launched ASCMs and torpedoes? There are suggestions China is also working on a DF-21D for submarines, based loosely on the JL submarine launched ballistic missiles.
Perhaps the artwork above is silly and far-fetched, but why are the Chinese planning for such a scenario, if so unrealistic?
Pan Hu
Interesting. I don’t suppose this is an easy question to answer.
I personally predicted as early as 2004 that China would develop an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) to hit US carriers – in fact I knew it would be a variant of the DF-21. In hindsight, the DF-21D was already well into its development at that time, before anyone started talking about it in US and Western defense circles.
When the DF-21D hit the headlines, I also knew that China would develop a submarine-launched version – common sense would dictate it. There is little doubt in my mind that the PLAN intends for ASBM-armed attack subs to be its weapon of choice in the Western Pacific. To field a fleet of 20 to 30 such subs is within reach in a 10-15 year timeframe, and would decidedly tilt the balance of naval power vis-a-vis Japan, the US, and other Asian powers. The key would be to integrate this fleet and its armament with the whole constellation of surveillance and reconnaisance assets that must work in conjunction to allow for the rapid strikes that the PLAN intends.
I think the real issue here is more psychological than anything else: Chinese strategists want to make their US, Japanese, and other Asian counterparts so discouraged by the sheer cost of building effective defenses against a large-scale ASBM threat that they must rethink their own approach to naval warfare entirely. This will be a test of our flexibility and adaptability: the nature of the game is changing and we would do well to think outside the box, because that’s what the Chinese are doing.
In my own brutally realistic opinion, considering China’s increased assertiveness in both the East and South China Seas, we’re already at a crossroads in the history of the Western Pacific. It may no longer be a viable framework at all to maintain Japan, Taiwan, the Phillippines, etc. under our security umbrella – from a cost-benefit perspective, that is.
We have to consider that China is most likely going to become the dominant military power in East Asia and the Western Pacific at one point or another, and under a responsible government (hopefully democratic in the future), may be trustworthy to take the lead in the region’s security. Why should we assume that won’t be a good thing?
Greg Moore
There is nothing to assume. Your suggestion of abandoning allies to give way for China to forcibly annex the South China Sea is ridiculous. As if the US itself is not a stake holder on the Pacific, the consequence could threaten strategic security of many nations including Australia as China closes the right of passage. More importantly, it will undermine the international order set by UNCLOS.
liaogz
Just push through Prompt Global Strike and X-47B and China will be sucking its thumb. Easy
M Hynes
DF-21D is still untested (as far as we know) against a moving naval target, so its potential operational effectiveness in unknown. The terminal guidance for a ballistic missile to hit a target moving in an evasive manner at 30kts would have to be pretty sophisticated, and thus vulnerable to electronic warfare and decoys.
SM-3 by comparison is a tested ABM/ASAT weapon. But it is very expensive and would have to purchased and deployed across AEGIS platforms in substantial bulk.
Given that only China would possibly be able to mount that kind of saturation attack against a US Carrier Strike Group, World War III would be my primary concern coming out of such a scenario.
Pan Hu
Like I said, China is likely aiming for the psychological effect of introducing a new variable into naval warfare. Granted, the DF-21D has not been tested in a live-fire scenario involving a moving target at sea, but in another 10 years or even 5 this will probably no longer be the case, and given the simmering disputes in the East and South China Seas, the PLA may have an opportunity to showcase this strike capability and send a clear message that it means serious business.
The sophisticated terminal guidance and anti-ECM technologies that the DF-21D will need are within China’s reach – they have the money and increasingly the technical know-how to ensure that at least some warheads in a saturation strike will get through. We must consider the whole suite of non-lethal weaponry these missiles will also make use of to soften US defenses: anti-radiation and EMP bursts, to consider only the most obvious.
The two things that the US must seriously consider are:
1. Better decoy and stealth measures, to hide a CVBG for as long as possible, so as to reduce the DF-21D’s effective strike radius.
2. An offensive answer to the Chinese missiles: at some point, it should make more sense to develop better offensive technologies to counter the ASBM threat which may give China a clear edge that is too expensive to balance by purely defensive means.