(Senior Master Sgt. Ray Lloyd, U.S. Air Force/DoD)
A C-130 Hercules with the 107th Airlift Wing fires off flares during a night formation training mission. A flare is an aerial infrared countermeasure to counter and infrared homing (heat seeking) surface-to-air or air-to-air missile.With the Air Force intending on killing the C-27J program (aircraft seen below) the C-130 will face the responsibility of making up for the lift capacity lost.
The ongoing argument over the C-27J, with congressional players fighting to keep the aircraft as they are operated by the guard and provide a mission for their state guardsmen and the DoD insisting that it can’t afford the aircraft, the C-27J isn’t entirely settled yet. But the Air Force continues to insist that the C-130 can pick up the load. Advocates for the C-27J point to its ability to operate using shorter runways while opponents say that the C-130 can handle most of the airfields in use and the C-27J is a luxury.
Members of the 110th Airlift Wing after the first C27J Spartan flight out of Battle Creek Air National Guard Base Battle Creek, Mich., Oct. 17, 2010. Members flew in the aircraft as part of a demonstration of the C27J Spartan. (Tech. Sgt. David Eichaker/USAF)
Noel Cognito
So this begs the question: why did the Air Force acquire the C-27J in the first place? The answer is simple: because they didn’t want the Army to have it.
cconway
This is the aircraft to fulfill the Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/MC) cargo delivery mission. At present, and during the times of the congressional hearings, the USAF admitted that they do not have a definition for TS/MC. They are working on it. In the mean time a parachute system will do half the mission (The Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS) is an American military airdrop system which uses the GPS, steerable parachutes, and an onboard computer). Of course these chutes will never pick up a load. If the expeditionary airfield is less than 3,000 feet long the C-130 shouldn’t even go in for a try. This is C-27J’s forte’. The C-27J handles shorter field of softer materials.
Half the engines, half the weight, about 1/3 the operating costs, and if the USAF were to embrace the airframe in Reserve and Active duty squadrons for TS/MC cargo deliver to the tune of 78 aircraft as originally estimated between the USAF/US Army agreement, regional maintenance facilities would half to be established, changing the entire cost equation, regardless of basing methodology. The USAF is focused on tons/miles/$ in 96 hours and have been from the beginning. That explains their position of not understanding the TS/MC mission set, and what kind of aircraft is required to meet that mission set, on a rapidly changing battle field. The US Army doe have to live there and should have retained purview over the program all along.